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Abstract. At EUROCRYPT ’10, van Dijk et al. presented simple fully-homomorphic
encryption (FHE) schemes based on the hardness of approximate integer com-
mon divisors problems, which were introduced in 2001 by Howgrave-Graham.
There are two versions for these problems: the partial version (PACD) and the
general version (GACD). The seemingly easier problem PACD was recently used
by Coron et al. at CRYPTO ’11 to build a more efficient variant of the FHE
scheme by van Dijk et al.. We present a new PACD algorithm whose running
time is essentially the “square root” of that of exhaustive search, which was the
best attack in practice. This allows us to experimentally break the FHE challenges
proposed by Coron et al. Our PACD algorithm directly gives rise to a new GACD
algorithm, which is exponentially faster than exhaustive search. Interestingly, our
main technique can also be applied to other settings, such as noisy factoring and
attacking low-exponent RSA.
1 Introduction
Following Gentry’s breakthrough work [9], there is currently great interest on fully-
homomorphic encryption (FHE), which allows to compute arbitrary functions on en-
crypted data. Among the few FHE schemes known [9, 28, 8, 3, 11], the simplest one
is arguably the one of van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan [28] (vDGHV),
published at EUROCRYPT ’10. The security of the vDGHV scheme is based on the
hardness of approximate integer common divisors problems introduced in 2001 by
Howgrave-Graham [15]. In the general version of this problem (GACD), the goal is
to recover a secret number p (typically a large prime number), given polynomially
many near-multiples x0, . . . , xm of p, that is, each integer xi is of the hidden form
xi = pqi+ri where each qi is a very large integer and each ri is a very small integer. In
the partial version of this problem (PACD), the setting is exactly the same, except that
x0 is chosen as an exact multiple of p, namely x0 = pq0 where q0 is a very large inte-
ger chosen such that no non-trivial factor of x0 can be found efficiently: for instance,
[8] selects q0 as a rough number, i.e. without any small prime factor.
By definition, PACD cannot be harder than GACD, and intuitively, it seems that
it should be easier than GACD. However, van Dijk et al. [28] mention that there is
currently no PACD algorithm that does not work for GACD. And the usefulness of
PACD is demonstrated by the recent construction [8], where Coron, Mandal, Naccache
and Tibouchi built a much more efficient variant of the FHE scheme by van Dijk et
al. [28], whose security relies on PACD rather than GACD. Thus, it is very important
to know if PACD is actually easier than GACD.
The hardness of PACD and GACD depends on how the qi’s and the ri’s are exactly
generated. For the generation of [28] and [8], the noise ri is extremely small, and the
best attack known is simply gcd exhaustive search: for GACD, this means trying every
noise (r0, r1) and check whether gcd(x0 − r0, x1 − r1) is sufficiently large and allows
to recover the secret key; for PACD, this means trying every noise r1 and check whether
gcd(x0, x1−r1) is sufficiently large and allows to recover the secret key. In other words,
if ρ is the bit-size of the noise ri, then breaking GACD (resp. PACD) requires 22ρ (resp.
2ρ) polynomial-time operations, for the parameters of [28, 8].
OUR RESULTS. We present new algorithms to solve PACD and GACD, which are ex-
ponentially faster in theory and practice than the best algorithms considered in [28,
8]. More precisely, the running time of our new PACD algorithm is 2ρ/2 polynomial-
time operations, which is essentially the “square root” of that of gcd exhaustive search.
This directly leads to a new GACD algorithm running in 23ρ/2 polynomial-time op-
erations, which is essentially the 3/4-th root of that of gcd exhaustive search. Our
PACD algorithm relies on classical algorithms to evaluate univariate polynomials at
many points, whose space requirements are not negligible. We therefore present addi-
tional tricks, some of which reduce the space requirements, while still providing sub-
stantial speedups. This allows us to experimentally break the FHE challenges proposed
by Coron et al. in [8], which were assumed to have comparable security to the FHE
challenges proposed by Gentry and Halevi in [10]: the latter GH-FHE-challenges are
based on hard problems with ideal lattices; according to Chen and Nguyen [4], their se-
curity level are respectively 52-bit (Toy), 61-bit (Small), 72-bit (Medium) and 100-bit
(Large). Table 1 gives benchmarks for our attack on the FHE challenges, and deduces
speedups compared to gcd exhaustive search. We can conclude that the FHE challenges
of [8] have a much lower security level than those of Gentry and Halevi [12].
Table 1. Time required to break the FHE challenges by Coron et al. [8]. Size in bits, running time
in seconds for a single 2.27GHz-core with 72 Gb. Timings are extrapolated for RAM > 72 Gb.
Name Toy Small Medium Large
Size(public key) 0.95Mb 9.6Mb 89Mb 802Mb
Size(modulus) 1.6 ∗ 105 0.86 ∗ 106 4.2 ∗ 106 19 ∗ 106
Size(noise) 17 25 33 40
Expected security level ≥ 42 ≥ 52 ≥ 62 ≥ 72
Running time of gcd-search 2420 8.3 ∗ 10
6 1.96 ∗ 1010 1.8 ∗ 1013
40 mins 96 days 623 years 569193 years
Concrete security level ≈ 42 ≈ 54 ≈ 65 ≈ 75
Running time of the new attack 99 25665 1.64 ∗ 10
7 6.6 ∗ 106 6.79 ∗ 1010 2.9 ∗ 108
1.6 min 7.1 hours 190 days 76 days 2153 years 9 years
Parameters d = 28 d = 212 d = 213 d = 215 d = 210 d = 219
Memory ≤ 130 Mb ≤ 15 Gb ≤ 72 Gb ≈ 240 Gb ≤ 72 Gb ≈ 25 Tb
Speedup 24 324 1202 2977 264 62543
New security level ≤ 37.7 ≤ 45.7 ≤ 55 ≤ 54 ≤ 67 ≤ 59
Interestingly, we can also apply our technique to different settings, such as noisy
factoring, fault attacks on RSA-CRT, and attacking low-exponent RSA encryption. A
typical example of noisy factoring is the following: assume that p is a divisor of a
public modulus N , and that one is given a noisy version p′ of p differing from p by at
most k bits at unknown positions, can one recover p from (p′, N) faster than exhaustive
search? This may have applications in side-channel attacks. Like in the PACD setting,
we obtain a square-root attack: for a 1024-bit modulus, the speedup can be as high
as 1200 in practice. Similarly, we speed up several exhaustive search attacks on low-
exponent RSA encryption.
RELATED WORK. Multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials has been used in
public-key cryptanalysis before. For instance, it is used in factoring (e.g. the Pollard-
Strassen factorization algorithm [22, 27] or in ECM speedup [19]), in the folklore square-
root attack on RSA with small CRT exponents (mentioned by [1] and described in [23,
20]), as well as in the recent square-root attack [7] by Coron, Joux, Mandal, Naccache
and Tibouchi on Groth’s RSA Subgroup Assumption [13]. But this does not imply that
our attack is trivial, especially since the authors of [8] form a subset of the authors of [7].
In fact, in most cryptanalytic applications (including [7]) of multipoint evaluation, one
is interested in the following problem: given two lists {ai}i and {bj}j of numbers mod-
ulo N, find a pair (ai, bj) such that gcd(ai − bj , N) is non-trivial. Instead, we use mul-
tipoint evaluation differently, as a way to compute certain products ofm elements mod-
ulo N in O˜(
√
m) polynomial-time operations, where O˜() is the usual notation hiding
poly-logarithmic terms. More precisely, it applies to products
∏m
i=1 xi mod N which




k=1(yj + zk) mod N where both m1 and m2
are O(
√
m). The Pollard-Strassen factorization algorithm [22, 27] can be viewed as a
special case of this technique: it computes m! mod N to factor N .
Very recently, Cohn and Heninger [5] announced a new attack on PACD and GACD,
based on Coppersmith’s small root technique. This attack is interesting from a theo-
retical point of view, but from a practical point of view, we provide evidence in the
full version [?] that for the FHE challenges of [8], it is expected to be slower than gcd
exhaustive search, and therefore much slower than our attack.
ROADMAP. In Sect. 2, we describe our square-root algorithm for PACD, and apply it
to GACD. In Sect. 3, we discuss implementation issues, present several tricks to speed
up the PACD algorithm in practice, and we discuss the impact of our algorithm on the
fully-homomorphic challenges of Coron et al. [8]. Finally, we apply our main technique
to different settings: noisy factoring (Sect. 4) and attacking low-exponent RSA (Sect. 5).
More information can be found in the full version [?].
2 A Square-Root Algorithm for Partial Approximate Common
Divisors
In this section, we describe our new square-root algorithm for the PACD problem, which
is based on evaluating univariate polynomials at many points. In the last subsection, we
apply it to GACD.
2.1 Overview
Consider an instance of PACD: x0 = pq0 and xi = pqi + ri where 0 ≤ ri < 2ρ, 1 ≤







(x1 − i) (mod x0)
)
(1)
which holds with overwhelming probability for the parameters of [8]. At first sight,
this observation only allows to replace 2ρ gcd computations (with numbers of size ≈ γ
bits) with essentially 2ρ modular multiplications (where the modulus has ≈ γ bits): the
benchmarks of [8] report a speedup of≈ 5 for the FHE challenges, which is insufficient
to impact security estimates.
However, we observe that (1) can be exploited in a much more powerful way as




(x1 − (x+ i)) (mod x0) (2)
Letting ρ′ = bρ/2c, we notice that:
2ρ−1∏
i=0














Clearly, (3) allows to solve PACD using one gcd, 2ρ
′+(ρ mod 2)− 1 modular multiplica-









2ρ) operations modulo x0, which is essentially the square root of
gcd exhaustive search. This is obvious for the single gcd and the modular multiplica-
tions. For the multi-evaluation part, it suffices to use classical algorithms (see [29, 17])
which evaluate a polynomial of degree d at d points, using at most O˜(d) operations in
the coefficient ring. Here, we also need to compute the polynomial f2ρ′ (x) explicitly,
which can fortunately also be done using O˜(
√
2ρ) operations modulo x0. We give a
detailed description of the algorithms in the next subsection.
2.2 Description
We first recall our algorithm to solve PACD, given as Alg. 1, and which was implicitly
presented in the overview.
Algorithm 1 Solving PACD by multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials
Input: An instance (x0, x1) of the PACD problem with noise size ρ.
Output: The secret number p such that x0 = pq0 and x1 = pq1 + r1 with appropriate sizes.
1: Set ρ′ ← bρ/2c.
2: Compute the polynomial f2ρ′ (x) defined by (2), using Alg. 2.
3: Compute the evaluation of f2ρ′ (x) at the 2
ρ′+(ρ mod 2) points
0, 2ρ
′
, . . . , 2ρ
′
(2ρ
′+(ρ mod 2) − 1), using 2ρ mod 2 times Alg. 3 with 2ρ′ points. Each
application of Alg. 3 requires the computation of a product tree, using Alg. 2.
Alg. 1 relies on two classical subroutines (see [29, 17]):
– a subroutine to (efficiently) compute a polynomial given as a product of n terms,
where n is a power of two: Alg. 2 does this in O˜(n) ring operations, provided
that quasi-linear multiplication of polynomials is available, which can be achieved
in our case using Fast Fourier techniques. This subroutine is used in Step 2. The
efficiency of Alg. 2 comes from the fact that when the algorithm requires a multi-
plication, it only multiplies polynomials of similar degree.
– a subroutine to (efficiently) evaluate a univariate degree-n polynomial at n points,
where n is a power of two: Alg. 3 does this in O˜(n) ring operations, provided that
quasi-linear polynomial remainder is available, which can be achieved in our case
using Fast Fourier techniques. This subroutine is used in Step 3, and requires the
computation of a tree product, which is achieved by Alg. 2. Alg. 3 is based on the
well-known fact that the evaluation of a univariate polynomial at a point α is the
same as its remainder modulo X − α, which allows to factor computations using a
tree.
Fig. 1. Polynomial product tree T = {t1, . . . , t2n} for {a1, . . . , an}.

 	X − a1t1 
 	X − a2t2 
 	X − a3t3 
 	X − a4t4 . . . 
 	X − an−1tn−1 













 	(X − a1)(X − a2)tn+1 : 
 	(X − a3)(X − a4)tn+2 : . . . 



























Input: A set of n = 2l numbers {a1, . . . , an}.
Output: The polynomial product tree T = {t1, . . . , t2n−1}, corresponding to the evaluation of
points A = {a1, . . . , an} as shown in Figure 1.
D = [d1, . . . , d2n−1] descendant indices for non-leaf nodes or 0 for leaf node.
1: for i = 1 . . . n do
2: ti ← X − ai; dj ← 0 {Initializing leaf nodes}
3: end for
4: i← 1; j ← n+ 1 {Index of lower and upper levels}
5: while j 6 2n− 1 do
6: tj ← ti · ti+1; dj ← i; i← i+ 2; j ← j + 1
7: end while
Fig. 2. Evaluation on the polynomial tree T = {t1, . . . , t2n−1} for {a1, . . . , an}.

 	f mod t1 
 	f mod t2 
 	f mod t3 
 	f mod t4 . . . 
 	f mod tn−1 















 	f mod t1 · t2 
 	f mod t3 · t4 . . . 


















Algorithm 3 V ← RecursiveEvaluation(f, ti, D)
Input: A polynomial f of degree n.
A polynomial product tree rooted at ti, and whose leaves are {X − ak, . . . , X − am}
An array D = [d1, . . . , d2n−1] descendant indices for non-leaf nodes or 0 for leaf node.
Output: V = {f(ak), . . . , f(am)}
1: if di = 0 then
2: return {f(ai)} {When ti is a leaf, we apply an evaluation directly.}
3: else
4: g1 ← f mod tdi {left subtree}
5: V1 ← RecursiveEvaluation(g1, tdi , D)
6: g2 ← f mod tdi+1 {right subtree}
7: V2 ← RecursiveEvaluation(g2, tdi+1, D)
8: return V1 ∪ V2
9: end if










2ρ) polynomially many bits: thus, Alg. 1 can be viewed as
a time/memory trade-off, compared to gcd exhaustive search.
2.3 Logarithmic speedup
In the previous analysis, the time complexity O˜(n) actually stands for O(n log2(n))
ring multiplications. Interestingly, Bostan, Gaudry and Schost showed in [2] that when
the structure of the factors are very regular, there is an algorithm which speeds up the
theoretical complexity by a logarithmic term log(n). This BGS algorithm is tailored for
the case where we want to estimate a function f on a set of points with what we call a
hypercubic structure. An important subprocedure is ShiftPoly which, given as input
a polynomial f of degree at most 2d, and the evaluations of f on a set of 2d points with
hypercubic structure, outputs the evaluation of f on a shifted set of 2d points, using
O(2d) ring operations. More precisely:
Theorem 1. (see Th. 5 of [2]) Let α, β be in ring P and d be in N such that d(α, β, d)
is invertible, with d(α, β, d) = β ·2 . . . d · (α−dβ) . . . (α+dβ). And suppose also that
the inverse of d(α, β, d) is known. Let F (·) ∈ P[X] of degree at most d and x0 ∈ P.
There exists an algorithm ShiftPoly which, given as input F (x0), F (x0 + β), . . . ,
F (x0+dβ), outputs F (x0+α), F (x0+α+β), . . . , F (x0+α+dβ) in time 2M(d)+
O(d) time and space O(d). Here, M(d) is the time of multiplying two polynomial of
degree at most d.





with each pki ranging over {0, 1}. This
is the set enumerating all possibilities of bits {k1, . . . , kj}. Given a setA and an element
and p, A+ p is defined as{a+ p, a ∈ A}. Then we have
E(k1, . . . , kj+1) = E(k1, . . . , kj) ∪
(




This is what we call a set with hypercubic structure.
Given a linear polynomial f(x) and a set with hypercubic structure of 2ρ points, the
proposed algorithm iteratively calls Alg.4 which uses ShiftPoly, and calculates the
evaluation of Fi(X) =
∏
Y ∈E(k1,...,ki) f(X +Y ) on E(bk−i, . . . , kρ) until i = bn/2c.
The i-th iteration costs O(2i) ring operations, thus the total complexity amounts to
O(2ρ/2) ring operations.
Algorithm 4 i-th iteration of the evaluation of Fi(X)
Input: For i = 1, . . . , bρ/2c, the evaluation of Fi(X) on points X ∈ E(kρ−i+1, . . . , kρ)
Output: the evaluation of Fi+1(X) on points X ∈ E(kρ−i, . . . , kρ)
1: Fi(X) for X ∈ E(kρ−i+1, . . . , kρ) + 2kρ−i ← ShiftPoly(Fi(X), X ∈
E(kρ−i+1, . . . , kρ))
2: Fi(X) for X ∈ E(kρ−i, . . . , kρ) + 2ki+1 ← ShiftPoly(Fi(X), X ∈ E(kρ−i, . . . , kρ))
3: Fi+1(X) = Fi(X) · Fi(X + 2ki+1), for all X ∈ E(kρ−i, . . . , kρ)
2.4 Application to GACD
Any PACD algorithm can be used to solve GACD, using the trivial reduction from
GACD to PACD based on exhaustive search over the noise r0. More precisely, for an
arbitrary instance of GACD:
xi = pqi + ri where 0 ≤ ri < 2ρ, 0 ≤ i ≤ m
we apply our PACD algorithm to all (x0−r0, x1) where r0 ranges over {0, . . . , 2ρ−1}.
It follows that GACD can be solved in O˜(23ρ/2) operations modulo x0, using
O˜(2ρ/2) polynomially many bits. This is exponentially faster than the best attack of [28],
namely gcd exhaustive search, which required 22ρ gcd operations. Note that in [28], an-
other hybrid attack was described, where one performs exhaustive search over r0 and
factors the resulting number using ECM, but because of the large size of the prime fac-
tors (namely, a bit-length ≥ ρ2), this attack is not faster: it also requires at least 22ρ
operations.
Following our work, it was noted with [?] that one can heuristically beat the GACD
bound O˜(23ρ/2) using more samples xi, by removing the “smooth part” of gcd(y1, . . . , ys)
where yi =
∏2ρ−1
j=0 (xi− j) and s is large enough. The choice of s actually gives differ-
ent time/memory trade-offs. For instance, if s = Θ(ρ), the running time is heuristically
O˜(2ρ) poly-time operations and similar memory. From a practical point of view how-
ever, our attack is arguably more useful, due to lower memory requirements and better
O˜() constants.
3 Implementation of the Square-Root PACD Algorithm
We implemented both Alg. 1 and the logarithmic speedup using the NTL library [25].
In this section, we describe various tricks that we used to implement efficiently Alg 1.
The implementation was not straightforward due to the size of the FHE challenges.
3.1 Obstructions
The main obstruction when implementing Alg. 1 is memory. Consider the Large FHE-
challenge from [8]: there, ρ = 40, so the optimal parameter is ρ′ = 20, which implies
that f2ρ′ is a polynomial of degree 2
20 with coefficients of size 19 × 106 bits. In other
words, simply storing f2ρ′ already requires 2
20×19×106 bits, which is more than 2Tb.
This means that in practice, we will have to settle for suboptimal parameters.
More precisely, assume that we select an additional parameter d, which is a power
of two less than 2ρ
′






This gives rise to a constrained version of Alg. 1, called Alg. 5.
Algorithm 5 Solving PACD by multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials, using
fixed memory
Input: An instance (x0, x1) of the PACD problem with noise size ρ, and a polynomial degree d
(which must be a power of two).
Output: The secret number p such that x0 = pq0 and x1 = pq1 + r1 with appropriate sizes.
1: Compute the polynomial fd(x) defined by (2), using Alg. 2.
2: Compute the evaluation of fd(x) at the 2ρ/d points 0, d, 2d, . . . , d(2ρ/d− 1), using 2ρ/d2
times Alg. 3 with d points. Each application of Alg. 3 requires the computation of a product
tree, using Alg. 2.
The running time of Alg. 5 is 2
ρO˜(d)
d2 elementary operations modulo x0, and the
space requirement is O˜(d) polynomially many bits. Note that each of the 2ρ/d2 times
applications of Alg. 3 can be done in parallel.
3.2 Tricks
The use of Alg. 5 allows several tricks, which we now present.
Minimizing the Product Tree. Each application of Alg. 3 requires the computation of
a product tree, using Alg. 2. But this product tree requires to store 2n− 1 polynomials.
Fortunately, these polynomials have coefficients which are in some sense much smaller
than the modulus x0: this is because we evaluate the polynomial fd(x) at points in
{0, . . . , 2ρ − 1}, which is very small compared to the modulus x0. However, a naive
implementation would not exploit this. For instance, consider the polynomial (X −
a1)(X−a2) = X2−(a1+a2)X+a1a2, which belongs to the product tree. In a typical
library for polynomial computations, the polynomial coefficients would be represented
as positive residues modulo x0. But if a1+a2 is small, then−(a1+a2)+x0 is actually
big. This means that many coefficients of the product tree polynomials will actually be
as big as x0, if they are represented as positive residues modulo x0, which drastically
reduces the choice of the degree d.
To avoid this problem, we instead slightly modify the polynomial fd(X), in order
to evaluate at small negative numbers inside {0, . . . , 1 − 2ρ}, so that each polynomial
of the product tree has “small” positive coefficients. This drastically reduces the storage

















d,k(−`) (mod x0) is computed by applying Alg. 3 once, using the
d points 0,−d,−2d, . . . ,−d(d− 1).
Powers of Two. We need to compute the polynomial f ′d,k(x) defined by (6) before each
application of Alg. 3, using a simplified version of Alg. 2, which only computes the root
rather than the whole product tree. However, notice that the degree of each polynomial
of the product tree is exactly a power of two, which is the worst case for the polynomial
multiplication implemented in the NTL library [25]. For instance, in NTL, multiplying
two 512-degree polynomials with Medium-FHE coefficients takes 50% more time than
multiplying two 511-degree polynomials with Medium-FHE coefficients.
To circumvent threshold phenomenons, we notice that each polynomial of the prod-
uct tree is a monic polynomial, except the leaves (for which the leading coefficient is
-1). But the product of two monic polynomials whose degree is a power of two can be
derived efficiently from the product of two polynomials with degree strictly less than
the power of two, using:
(Xn + P (X))× (Xn +Q(X)) = X2n +Xn(P (X) +Q(X)) + P (X)Q(X).
We apply this trick to speed up the computation of the polynomial f ′d,k(x).
Precomputations. Now that we use (5), we change several times the polynomial
f ′d,k(x), but we keep the same evaluation points 0,−d,−2d, . . . ,−d(d−1), and there-
fore the same product tree. This allows to perform precomputations to speed up Alg. 3.
Indeed, the main operation of Alg. 3 is computing the remainder of a polynomial with
one of the product tree polynomials, and it is well-known that this can be sped up using
precomputations depending on the modulus polynomial. One classical way to do this is
to use Newton’s method for remainder (Alg. 6). This algorithm requires the following
notation: for any polynomial f of degree n and for any integer m > n, we define the
m-degree polynomial rev(f,m) as rev(f,m) = f(1/X) · Xm. In Alg. 6, Line 1 is
Algorithm 6 Remainder using Newton’s method (see [17, Sect 7.2])
Input: Polynomials f ∈ R[X] of degree 2n− 1, g ∈ R[X] of degree n.
Output: The polynomial h = f mod g
1: g¯ ← Inverse(rev(g, n)) mod Xn
2: s← rev(f, 2n− 1) · g¯ mod Xn
3: h← f − rev(s, n− 1) · g
independent of f . Therefore, whenever one needs to compute many remainders with
respect to the same modulus g, it is more efficient to precompute and store h, so that
Line 1 does not need to be reexecuted. Hence, in an offline phase, we precompute and
store (on a hard disk) the polynomial g¯ of Line 1 for each product tree polynomial. And
for each remainder required by Alg. 3, we execute the last two lines of Alg. 6.
It follows that each remainder operation of Alg. 3 is reduced to two polynomial
multiplications.
The NTL library also contains routines for doing remainders with precomputations,
but Alg. 6 turns out to be more efficient for our setting. This is because many factors
impact the performance of polynomial arithmetic, such as the size of the modulus and
the degree.
3.3 Logarithmic Speedup and Further Tricks
We also implemented the BGS algorithm described in Sect. 2.3, which offers an asymp-
totical logarithmic speedup, but our implementation was not optimized: a better imple-
mentation would require the so-called middle product [2], which we instantiated by a
normal product. On the FHE challenges, our implementation turned out to be twice as
slow as Alg. 1 for Medium and Large, and marginally slower (resp. faster) for Toy (resp.
Small).
Since memory is the main obstruction for choosing d, it is very important to mini-
mize RAM requirements. Since Alg. 3 can be reduced to multiplications using precom-
putations, one may consider the use of special multiplication algorithms which require
less memory than standard algorithms, such as in-place algorithms. We note that there
has been recent work [24, 14] in this direction, but we did not implement these algo-
rithms. This suggests that our implementation is unlikely to be optimal, and that there
is room for improvement.
3.4 New Security Estimates for the FHE Challenges
Table 1 reports benchmarks for our implementation on the fully-homomorphic-encryption
challenges of Coron et al. [8], which come in four flavours: Toy, Small, Medium and
Large. The security level ` is defined in [8] is defined as follows: the best attack should
require at least 2` clock cycles on a standard single core. The row “Expected security
level” is extracted from [8].
Our timings refer to a single 2.27GHz-core with 72Gb of RAM. First, we assessed
the cost of gcd exhaustive search, by measuring the running time of the (quasi-linear)
gcd routine of the widespread gmp library, which is used in NTL [25]: timings were
measured for each modulus size of the four FHE-challenges. This gives the “concrete
security level” row, which is slightly higher than the expected security level of [8].
We also report timings for our implementation of our square-root PACD algo-
rithm: these timings are below the expected security level, which breaks all four FHE-
challenges of [8]. For the Toy and Small challenges, the parameter d was optimal, and
we did not require much memory: the speedup is respectively 24 and 324, compared
to gcd exhaustive search. For the Medium and Large challenges, we used a suboptimal
parameter d, due to RAM constraints: we used d = 213 (resp. d = 210) for Medium
(resp. Large), instead of the optimal d = 216 (resp. d = 220). But the speedups are
already significant: 1202 for Medium, and 264 for Large. The timings are obtained by
suitably multiplying the running time of a single execution of Alg. 3 and Alg. 2: for
instance, in the Large case, this online phase took between 64727s to 65139.4s, for 5
executions, and the precomputation storage was 21Gb.
Table 1 also provides extrapolated figures if the RAM was ≥ 72 Gb, which allows
larger values of d: today, one can already buy servers with 4-Tb RAM. For the Large
challenge, the potential speedup is over 60,000. Using a more optimized implementa-
tion, we believe it is possible to obtain larger speedups, so the “New security level”
row should only be interpreted as an upper bound. But our implementation is already
sufficient to show that the FHE-challenges of [8] fall short of the expected security
level.
Hence, one needs to increase the parameters of the FHE scheme of [8], which makes
it less competitive with the FHE implementation of [12]. It can be noted that the new se-
curity levels of the challenges of [8] are much lower than those given by [4] on the chal-
lenges of Gentry and Halevi [12], namely 52-bit (Toy), 61-bit (Small), 72-bit (Medium)
and 100-bit (Large).
4 Applications to Noisy Factoring
Consider a typical “balanced” RSA modulus N = pq where p, q ≤ 2√N . A celebrated
lattice-based cryptanalysis result of Coppersmith [6] states that if one is given half of
the bits of p, either in the most significant positions, or the least significant positions,
then one can recover p and q in polynomial time. Although this attack has been extended
in several works (see [18] for a survey), all these lattice-based results require that the
unknown bits are consecutive, or spread across extremely few blocks. This decreases
its potential applications to side-channel attacks where errors are likely to be spread
unevenly.
This suggests the following setting, which we call noisy factoring. Assume that one
is given a noisy version p′ of the prime factor p, which differs from p by at most k bits,
not necessarily consecutive, under either of the following two cases:
– If the k positions of the noisy bits are known, we can recover p (and therefore q)
by exhaustive search using at most 2k polynomial-time operations: we stress that
in this case, we assume that we do not know if each of the k bits has been flipped,
otherwise no search would be necessary.
– If instead, none of the positions is known, but we know that exactly k bits have been






time operations, where n is the bit-length of p. If we only know an upper bound
on the number of modified bits, we can simply repeat the attack with decreasing
values of k.
These running times do not require that p and q are balanced.
In this section, we show that our previous technique for PACD can be adapted to
noisy factoring, yielding new attacks whose running time is essentially the “square






depending on the case.
4.1 Known positions
We assume that the prime number p has n bits, so that: p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi2
i, where pi ∈
{0, 1} for 0 6 i 6 n− 1.
In this subsection, we assume that all the bits pi are known, except possibly at k
positions b1, . . . , bk, which we sort, so that: 0 ≤ b1 6 · · · 6 bk < n. Denote by
p(1), . . . , p(2
k) the 2k possibilities for p, when (pb1 , . . . , pbk) ranges over {0, 1}k. With






A naive evaluation of (7) costs 2k modular multiplications, and one single gcd. We now
show that this evaluation can be performed more efficiently using O˜(2k/2) arithmetic
operations with numbers with the same size as N .
The unknown bits pb1 , . . . , pbk can be regrouped into two sets {pb1 , . . . , pb`}, and
{pb`+1 , . . . , pk} of roughly the same size ` = bk/2c:
– For 1 6 i ≤ 2`, let y(i) = ∑n−1j=0 y(i)j 2j , where y(i)j =
 0 if j > b`t-th bit of i if ∃t 6 `, j = bt
pj otherwise
,
– For 1 6 i ≤ 2k−`, let x(i) = ∑n−1j=0 xj2j , where x(i)j =
 0 if j 6 blt-th bit of i if ∃t > l, j = bt
pj otherwise
,








(x(j) + y(i)) (modN) (8)
which gives rise to a square-root algorithm (Alg. 7) to solve the noisy factorization
problem with known positions.
Algorithm 7 Noisy Factorization With Known Positions
Input: An RSA modulusN = pq and the bits p0, . . . , pn−1 of p, except the k bits pb1 , . . . , pbk ,
where the bit positions b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bk are known.
Output: The secret factor p =
∑n−1
i=0 pi2
i of N .






mod N of degree 2`, with coefficients
modulo N , using Alg. 2.
2: Compute the evaluation of f(X) at the points {x(1), . . . , x(2k−`)}, using 1 + (k mod 2)
times Alg. 3 with 2` points.










Similary to Section 2, the cost of Alg. 7 is O˜(2k/2) polynomial-time operations.
This is an exponential improvement over naive exhaustive search, but Alg. 7 requires
exponential space. In practice, the improvement is substantial. Using our previous im-
plementation, Alg. 7 gives a speedup of about 1200 over exhaustive division to factor
a 1024-bit modulus, given a 512-bit noisy factor with 46 unknown bits at known posi-
tions.
Furthermore, in this setting, the points to be enumerated happen to satisfy the hy-
percubic property, thus we may apply the logarithmic speedup described in Sect. 2.3.


















Algorithm 8 Improved Noisy Factorization With Known Positions
Input: An RSA modulusN = pq and a number p′ differing from p by exactly k bits of unknown
position.
Output: The secret factor p.
1: F0(0)←Mp
2: for i = 1, . . . , bk/2c do
3: Call Alg. 4 to calculate the evaluation of Fi(X) on E(bk−i, bk) given the evaluation of
Fi−1(X) on E(bk−i+1, bk)
4: end for
5: if k is odd then
6: The evaluation Fbk/2c(X) for X ∈ E(bbk/2c+2, . . . , bk) + 2bbk/2c+1
←ShiftPoly(Fbk/2c(X), X ∈ E(bbk/2c+2, . . . , bk), 2bbk/2c+1)
7: end if









As discussed in Section 2, the cost of Alg. 8 is faster than Alg. 7 by a factor ofO(k)
on a theoretical basis.
4.2 Unknown positions
In this subsection, we assume that p′ differs from p by exactly k bits at unknown posi-
tions, and that p′ has bit-length n. Our attack is somewhat reminiscent of Coppersmith’s
baby-step/giant-step attack on low-Hamming-weight discrete logarithm [26], but that
attack uses sorting, not multipoint evaluation. To simplify the description, we assume
that both k and n are even, but the attack can easily be adapted to the general case.
Pick a random subset S of {0, . . . , n − 1} containing exactly n/2 elements. The


















. Similarly to the previous
subsection, we define:
– Let x(i) for 1 6 i ≤ ` be the numbers obtained by copying the bits of p′ at all the
positions inside S, and flipping exactly k/2 bits: all the other bits are set to zero.
– Let y(i) for 1 6 i ≤ ` be the numbers obtained by copying the bits of p′ at all the
positions outside S, and flipping exactly k/2 bits: all the other bits are set to zero.






(x(j) + y(i)) (modN)) (10)
which gives rise to a square-root algorithm (Alg. 9) to solve the noisy factorization
problem with unknown positions.
Algorithm 9 Noisy Factorization With Unknown Positions
Input: An RSA modulusN = pq and a number p′ differing from p by exactly k bits of unknown
position.
Output: The secret factor p.
1: repeat
2: Pick a random subset S of {0, . . . , n− 1} containing exactly n/2 elements.






4: Compute the polynomial f(X) =
∏`
j=1(X + y
(j)) mod N .
5: Compute the evaluation of f(X) at the ` points {x(1), . . . , x(`)}.










7: until p′′ > 1
8: return p′′
Similary to Section 2, the expected cost of Alg. 9 is O˜(`
√
k) polynomial-time op-










. This is an exponential improvement
over naive exhaustive search, but Alg. 9 requires exponential space.
Alg. 9 is randomized, but like Coppersmith’s baby-step/giant-step attack on low-
Hamming-weight discrete logarithm [26], it can easily be derandomized using splitting
systems. Deterministic versions are slightly less efficient, by a small polynomial factor:
see [26].
5 Applications to Low-Exponent RSA
Our previous algorithms for noisy factoring easily apply to fault attacks on RSA-CRT
signatures where few bits of the message are unknown. There, one retrieves the factor-
ization by computing gcd(se −m (modN), N) where s is a faulty RSA signature of a
message m, This requires the full knowledge of the message m, but our attack applies
when not all bits are known, just like in noisy factoring. In this section, we show that
our algorithms can also be adapted to attacks on low-exponent RSA encryption. Con-
sider an RSA ciphertext c = me mod N , where the public exponent e is very small.
Assume that one knows a noisy version m′ of the plaintext m, which differs from m
by at most k bits, not necessarily consecutive, under exactly the same two cases as for
noisy factoring. This setting is usually called stereotyped RSA encryption [6]: there
are well-known lattice attacks [6, 18] against stereotyped RSA, but they require that the
unknown bits are consecutive, or split across extremely few blocks.
Known Positions. Assume that m is a plaintext of n bits, among which only k bits
are unknown, whose (arbitrary) positions are b1, . . . , bk. Let c = me mod N be the
raw RSA ciphertext of m. If e is small (say, constant), we can “square root” the time of
exhaustive search, using multipoint polynomial evaluation.
Let ` = d(k − log2 e)/2e, and assume that k > 0. Let m0 be derived from m
by keeping all the known n − k bits, and setting all the k unknown bits to 0. For
1 6 i 6 2k−`, let the xi’s enumerate all the integers when (b`+1, . . . , bk) ranges over
{0, 1}k−`. Similarly, for 1 6 j 6 2`, let the yj’s enumerate all the integers when
(b1, . . . , b`) ranges over {0, 1}`.
Thus, there is a unique pair (i, j) such that: c = (m0 +xi + yj)e mod N. Now, we
define the polynomial f(X) =
2`∏
i=1
((m0 + yi +X)
e − c) mod N , which is of degree
e2`. If xt corresponds to the correct guess for the bits b`+1, . . . , bk, then f(xt) = 0.
Hence, if we evaluate f(X) at x1, . . . , x2k−` , we would be able to derive the k − `
higher bits b`+1, . . . bk, which gives rise to Alg. 10.
Algorithm 10 Decrypting Low-Exponent RSA With Known Positions
Input: An RSA modulus N = pq and a ciphertext c = me mod N , where all the bits of m are
known, except at k positions b1, . . . , bk.
Output: The plaintext m.
1: Compute the polynomial f(X) =
2`∏
i=1
((m0 + yi +X)
e − c) mod N of degree e2`, with
coefficients modulo N , using Alg. 2.
2: Compute the evaluation of f(X) at the points x(1), . . . , x(2
k−`), using sufficiently many
times Alg. 3.
3: Find the unique i such that f(x(i)) = 0.
4: Deduce from x(i) the bits b`+1, . . . , bk.
5: Find the remaining bits b1, . . . , b` by exhaustive search.
By definition of `, we have:
√




e2k/2 ≤ 2k−` ≤
2 ×
√
e2k. It follows that the overall complexity of Alg. 10. is O˜(
√
e2k) polynomial-
time operations, which is the “square root” of exhaustive search if e is constant.
Unknown Positions. In the previous section, we showed how to adapt our noisy fac-
toring algorithm with known positions (Alg. 7) to the RSA case. Similarly, our noisy
factoring algorithm with unknown positions (Alg. 9) can also be adapted. If the plaintext
m is known except for exactly k unknown bit positions, then one can recover m using
on the average O˜(`
√










Variants. Our technique was presented to decrypt stereotyped low-exponent RSA ci-
phertexts, but the same technique clearly applies to a slightly more general setting,
where the RSA equation is replaced by an arbitrary univariate low-degree polynomial
equation. More precisely, instead of c = me mod N , we may assume that P (m) ≡
0 (modN) where P is a univariate integer polynomial of degree e. This allows to adapt
various attacks [6] on low-exponent RSA, such as randomized padding across several
blocks.
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